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Advancing Bitcoin Security: The Journey from Basic Wallets to Advanced Protocols

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Security strategies within the Bitcoin network are in a constant state of progression, and in this exploration, we will assess how these strategies have evolved from simple digital wallets to complex multi-signature mechanisms.

This includes an overview of the latest advancements in cryptographic technologies, such as Schnorr signatures. In simple terms, we will examine these technologies that help to provide the necessary fortifications that act as the foundation behind Bitcoin’s security framework.

We will also consider some of the major security incidents in recent years and the lessons that were learned. The overall aim of this piece is to emphasize the importance of the Bitcoin community in developing new ways to secure Bitcoin infrastructure and strengthen blockchain technology – this need is further emphasized by the impending threat of quantum computing …

How Has Bitcoin Security Has Evolved Over The Years

Since Bitcoin’s launch in 2009, the world of finance and technology has been completely transformed, moving toward ultimate financial freedom as an ambitious yet noble goal. As a decentralized cryptocurrency, Bitcoin has surged in value and become the 13th major currency in the world. However, this value has also presented a range of security challenges.

To think that, just a decade and a half ago, the most we could do with Bitcoin was to buy a pizza, it’s not hard to see how we ended up with today’s wallet standards.

Bitcoin initially relied on rather basic security solutions such as digital wallets that stored cryptographic keys to facilitate transactions. These wallets, although effective in basic terms, lacked the necessary security to prevent malware threats and cybersecurity threats which quickly became more sophisticated as the years passed – requiring innovations to keep Bitcoin safe.

Software Wallets

Early digital wallets were basic software that sat on a person’s hard drive, storing private, cryptographic keys that allowed users to access and transfer their Bitcoin.

As Bitcoin’s value grew and cybercriminals became aware of its potential, the need for better security became paramount to prevent widespread hacking and theft. Initially, digital wallets were improved with better encryption and dedicated user interfaces but this did little to stem the tide of a growing number of cyber threats.

Improving and maintaining software wallets became a somewhat futile task for developers who were forced to constantly run API penetration tests, stress tests, and various other security exercises to ensure a high level of security. As a result, a new, more practical solution was created.

Hardware Wallets

These hardware devices stored private keys offline and negated a lot of the threats that were linked to software wallets that were connected to the internet. Hardware wallets came in the form of a small device that connected to a computer via USB — two popular hardware examples were Ledger and Trezor.

Although hardware wallets were offline and required a pin code to access, and if lost, recovering these pin codes was a multi-faceted process. This higher level of security led to these devices growing in popularity as they were not susceptible to malware attacks, private keys never left the device, and transactions were completed within the wallet before being confirmed on the blockchain.

Multi-signature Wallets

These advanced wallets required multiple signatures or approvals from multiple users before any transactions could be executed. This drastically reduced the chance of any unauthorized access and this method was favored by businesses and organizations who regularly made large-scale Bitcoin transactions.

To make a transaction, two or more private keys are required to authorize the activity, similar to written contracts that require multiple signatures. This way, even if one private key has been hacked, the Bitcoin within the wallet still cannot be accessed.

Advancements/ Taproot and Schnorr Signatures

Taproot was a significant upgrade to the Bitcoin network that was designed to improve scalability and brought about a series of enhancements. One such enhancement was Schnorr signatures which offered multiple benefits over the previous Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) mechanism which facilitated the generation and verification of private keys.

The key benefits of Schnorr signatures were that they allowed for smaller signature sizes, offered quicker verification times, and provided better protection against certain cyberattacks. Key aggregation was the most significant enhancement of Schnorr signatures which reduced the size of multi-sig private keys so they take up less space in a block and incur the same transaction fees as a single-party transaction.

Another important upgrade was the non-malleability feature that prevents cybercriminals from modifying a valid signature to allow them to commit malicious activity. Schnorr signatures also improve the privacy of multi-sig wallets, increasing their complexity significantly when compared to single signatures.

Preparing For Future Threats To Bitcoin

The rise of quantum computing poses a significant threat to Bitcoin, as these machines can solve extremely complex problems that standard computers cannot. This can include deciphering cryptographic keys. Should this technology become more accessible and fall into the hands of cybercriminals, the risk of unauthorized access to all types of wallets becomes significant and could lead to the complete collapse of the cryptocurrency market if there is no solution.

The Bitcoin community has been busy conducting ongoing research to assist in the development of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms.

The hope is that the development of these advanced algorithms will provide sufficient protection against this impressive computational power but the key challenge is the successful implementation of them into the Bitcoin network. This process will be extremely complex, requiring a precise orchestration of all users, from developers to miners.

Creating algorithms that even a quantum computer cannot crack is a monumental task and is described as post-quantum cryptography. Although the development of these cutting-edge algorithms is still in its early stages, more and more developers are lending their hand to the cause and things are expected to accelerate in the next few years.

High-Profile Bitcoin Security Incidents

Let’s consider two recent Bitcoin security incidents that have caused major disruption and helped to change the way we think about securing cryptocurrency.

Ronin Network breach – In March 2022, the highest-value cryptocurrency attack was the breach of the Ronin Network which powered the extremely popular Axie Infinity blockchain gaming platform. By breaching this network, cybercriminals stole around $625m worth of cryptocurrency.

North Korean state-backed hackers, Lazarus Group are thought to be the culprits and It is believed they obtained five of the nine private keys held by transaction validators that were required to access Ronin Network’s cross-chain bridge (a decentralized application that facilitates transactions).

Binance Exchange hack – Back in October 2022, one of the world’s biggest cryptocurrency exchanges, Binance was hacked, with $570m stolen. Hackers targeted the BSC Token Hub, a cross-chain bridge, and exploited a bug in a smart contract to extract Binance coins.

As well as high-profile cases such as this, the countless number of individuals that cybercriminals have targeted is an even bigger concern. Some people can become complacent when it comes to securing their Bitcoin keys, while various platforms can employ outdated processes or need to provide more security. For example, If a wallet, platform, or application has a QR code for registration, this can be a significant security flaw, especially given that hackers have already targeted features like this.

Conclusion – What Have We Learned?

These high-level cybercrime cases show that even the most advanced and high-profile cryptocurrency institutions struggle to keep up with the latest cybercrime techniques. In addition to vast and complex blockchain networks and secondary-level, third-party applications, the resources needed to secure Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are substantial.

Although multi-sig wallets provide impressive protection, they are not ironclad. This is why developing advanced algorithms, such as those created to fend off quantum computing attacks is the key focus to ensure the future of cryptocurrency. 

This is a guest post by Kiara Taylor. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.



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Fractal Bitcoin

Fractal Bitcoin: A Misleading Affinity

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Fractal Bitcoin is a recently launched project that bills itself as “the only native scaling solution completely and instantly compatible with Bitcoin. In essence it is a merge mined system portraying itself as a second layer sidechain for Bitcoin, where multiple levels of “sidechains” can be stacked on top of each other. So think of a sidechain of the mainchain, a sidechain of the sidechain, a sidechain of the sidechain of the sidechain, etc. It is not.

Shitcoins Are Not Second Layers

Firstly, the entire system is built around a new native token, Fractal Bitcoin, that is issued completely independent of Bitcoin. It even comes with a massive pre-mine of 50% of the supply being split between an “ecosystem treasury”, a pre-sale, advisors, grants for the community, and developers. This is essentially the equivalent of the entire first halving period of Bitcoin when the block subsidy was 50 BTC per block. From here the network jumps to 25 Fractal Bitcoin (FB) per block.

Secondly, there is no peg mechanism for moving actual bitcoin into the “sidechain.” Yes, you read that correctly. They are framing themselves as a sidechain/layer two, but there is no actual mechanism to move your bitcoin back and forth between the mainchain and “the sidechain” Fractal Bitcoin. It is a completely independent system with no actual ability to move funds back and forth. One of the core aspects of a sidechain is the ability to peg, or “lock,” your bitcoin from the mainchain and move it into a sidechain system so that you can make use of it there, eventually moving those funds back to the mainchain.

Fractal Bitcoin has no such mechanism, and not only that, the discussion around the topic in their “technical litepaper” is completely incoherent. They discuss Discreet Log Contracts (DLCs) as a mechanism for “bridging” between different levels of Fractal sidechains. DLCs are not a suitable mechanism for a peg at all. DLCs function by pre-defining where coins will be sent based on a signature from an oracle or a set of oracles expected at a given time. They are used for gambling, financial products such as derivatives, etc. between two parties. DLCs are not designed to allow funds to be sent to any arbitrary place based on the outcome of the contract, they are designed to allocate funds to one of two participants, or proportionally to each participant, based on the outcome of some contract or event that an oracle signs off on.

This is not suitable for a sidechain or other system peg, which is ideally architected to allow any current owner of coins in the sidechain or second layer system to freely send coins to any destination they choose so long as they have valid control over them on the other system. So not only is there no functional peg mechanism for the live system, but their hand waving about potential designs for one in their litepaper is just completely incoherent.

The whole “design” is a clown show designed to pump bags for pre-mine holders.

“Cadence” Mining

Another troubling aspect of the system is its variation on merge mining, Cadence mining. The network utilizes SHA256 as the hashing algorithm, and it does support conventional Namecoin style merge mining. But there is a catch. Only one third of the blocks produced on the network are capable of being produced by Bitcoin miners engaged in merge mining. The other two thirds must be mined conventionally by miners switching their hashrate entirely over to Fractal Bitcoin.

This is a poisonous incentive structure. It essentially tries to associate itself with the Bitcoin network calling itself a “merge mined system”, when in reality two thirds of the block production mandates turning hashrate away from securing the Bitcoin network and devoting it exclusively to securing Fractal Bitcoin. Most of the retard is not capturable by miners who continue mining Bitcoin, and the greater the value of FB the greater the incentive for Bitcoin miners to defect and begin mining it instead of bitcoin to increase the share of the FB reward they capture.

It essentially functions as an incentive distortion for Bitcoin miners proportional to the value of the overall system. It also offers no advantage in terms of security at all. By forcing this choice it guarantees that most of the network difficulty must remain low enough that whatever small portion of miners find it profitable to defect from Bitcoin to FB can mine blocks at the targeted 30 second block interval. Conventional merge mining would allow the entire mining network to contribute security without having to deal with the opportunity cost of not mining Bitcoin.

What’s The Point of This?

The ostensible point of the network is to facilitate things like DeFi and Ordinals, that consume large amounts of blockspace, by giving them a system to utilize other than the mainchain. The problem with this logic is the reason those systems are built on the mainchain in the first place is because people value the immutability and security that it provides. Nothing about the architecture of Fractal Bitcoin provides the same security guarantees.

Even if they did, there is no functional pegging mechanism at all to facilitate these assets from being interoperable between the mainchain and the Fractal Bitcoin chain. The entire system is a series of handwaves past important technical details to rush something to market that allows insiders to profit off of the pre-mine involved in the launch.

No peg mechanism, an incoherent “merge mining” scheme that not only creates a poisonous incentive distortion should it continue rising in value, but actually guarantees a lower level of proof of work security, and a bunch of buzzwords. It does have CAT active, but so do testnets in existence. So even the argument as a testing ground for things built using CAT is just incoherent and a half assed rationalization for a pre-mined token pump.

Calling this a sidechain, or a layer of Bitcoin, is beyond ridiculous. It’s a token scheme, pure and simple. 



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Opinion

The (Zero-Knowledge Proof) Singularity Is Near

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The broader impact of proof singularity extends beyond individual blockchain networks, as it paves the way for a more interconnected and scalable Web3 ecosystem. As ZK proofs become faster and more efficient, cross-chain communication and interoperability can be greatly improved, enabling seamless, secure interactions between various blockchain protocols. This could lead to a paradigm shift where data privacy and security are inherently built into the infrastructure, fostering trust and compliance in industries that require rigorous data protection standards, such as healthcare, finance, and supply chain management.



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Opinion

Bitcoin’s Future in Payments: Overcoming Stablecoin Dominance with Fiatless Fiat

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Stablecoins have so far dominated the crypto payment market, but some Bitcoin developers believe there’s a proposal out there that could offer a legitimate alternative. 

Seven years ago, Dorier, a long-time developer, set out to democratize bitcoin payment processing by launching a free and open-source alternative to the then-dominant BitPay: BTCPay Server. Today, despite the project’s strong grassroots success among Bitcoin enthusiasts and online merchants, the landscape of cryptocurrency payments has evolved dramatically from when Dorier first began his journey. The rise of stablecoins has quickly dominated the space, pushing bitcoin—the world’s largest digital asset—to the sidelines in the payment processing arena.

Fueled by growing demand for stable currency options, particularly US dollars, stablecoins have swiftly taken over the cryptocurrency payments market. This surge has left many Bitcoin enthusiasts struggling to cope with the reality that these dollar-pegged assets could reinforce the very system Bitcoin was designed to challenge—the hegemony of the US dollar. As stablecoins continue to gain traction, Bitcoin promoters find themselves at a crossroads, questioning how to preserve Bitcoin’s vision of financial sovereignty in a market increasingly leaning toward stability over decentralization.

A new proposal emerging from the Lightning ecosystem has caught Dorier’s attention, and the veteran developer believes it could address this obstacle. Speaking to a packed audience at BTCPay Server’s recent annual community gathering in Riga, Dorier introduced the concept of “fiatless fiat”—a Bitcoin-native alternative to treasury-backed stablecoins like Tether and USDC.

Synthetic USD

Back in 2015, BitMEX co-founder and then-CEO Arthur Hayes outlined in a blog post how to use futures contracts to create synthetic US dollars. Although this idea never gained widespread traction, it became a popular strategy among traders seeking to hedge against bitcoin’s volatility without having to sell their underlying bitcoin positions.

For readers less familiar with financial derivatives, a synthetic dollar (or synthetic position) can be created by two parties entering a contract to speculate on the price movement of an underlying asset—in this case, bitcoin. Essentially, by taking an opposite position to their bitcoin holdings in a futures contract, traders can protect themselves from price swings without having to sell their bitcoin or rely on a US dollar instrument.

More recently, services like Blink Wallet have adopted this concept through the Stablesats protocol. Stablesats allows users to peg a portion of their bitcoin balance to a fiat currency, such as the US dollar, without converting it into traditional currency. In this model, the wallet operator acts as a “dealer” by hedging the user’s pegged balance using futures contracts on centralized exchanges. The operator then tracks the respective liabilities, ensuring that the user’s pegged balance maintains its value relative to the chosen currency. (More detailed information about the mechanism can be found on the Stablesats website.)

Obviously, this setup comes with a significant trade-off. By using Stablesats or similar services, users effectively relinquish custody of their funds to the wallet operator. The operator must then manage the hedging process and maintain the necessary contracts to preserve the synthetic peg.

Stable channels and virtual balances

In Riga, Dorier pointed out that a similar effect can be achieved between two parties using a different type of contract: Lightning channels. The idea follows recent work from Bitcoin developer Tony Klaus on a mechanism called stable channels.

Instead of relying on centralized exchanges, stable channels connect users seeking to hedge their Bitcoin exposure with ‘stability providers’ over the Lightning network. A stable channel essentially functions as a shared Bitcoin balance, where funds are allocated according to the desired exposure of the ‘stability receiver.’ Leveraging Lightning’s rapid settlement capabilities, the balance can be continuously adjusted in response to price fluctuations, with sats shifting to either side of the channel as needed to maintain the agreed distribution.

Here’s a simple chart to illustrate what the fund’s breakdown may look like over time:

credit: Tony Klaus

Clearly, this strategy entails considerable risks. As illustrated above, stability providers taking leveraged long positions on the exchange are exposed to large downside price volatility. Moreover, once the reserves of these stability providers are exhausted, users aiming to lock in their dollar-denominated value will no longer be able to absorb further price declines. While those types of rapid drawdowns are increasingly rare, Bitcoin’s volatility is always unpredictable and it’s conceivable that stability providers may look to hedge their risks in different ways.

On the other hand, the structure of this construct allows participants’ exposure within the channel to be linked to any asset. Provided both parties independently agree on a price, this can facilitate the creation of virtual balances on Lightning, enabling users to gain synthetic exposure to a variety of traditional portfolio instruments, such as stocks and commodities, assuming these assets maintain sufficient liquidity. Researcher Dan Robinson originally proposed an elaborated version of this idea under the name Rainbow Network.

The good, the bad, the ugly

The concept of “fiatless fiat” and stable channels is compelling because of its simplicity. Unlike algorithmic stablecoins that rely on complex and unsustainable economic models involving exogenous assets, the Bitcoin Dollar, as envisioned by Dorier and others, is purely the result of a voluntary, self-custodial agreement between two parties.

This distinction is critical. Stablecoins usually involve a centralized governing body overseeing a global network, while a stable channel is a localized arrangement where risk is contained to the participants involved. Interestingly, it does not even have to rely on network effects: one user can choose to receive USD-equivalent payments from another, and subsequently shift the stability contract to a different provider at their discretion. Stability provision has the potential to become a staple service from various Lightning Service Provider types of entities competing and offering different rates.

This focus on local interactions helps mitigate systemic risk and fosters an environment more conducive to innovation, echoing the original end-to-end principles of the internet.

The protocol allows for a range of implementations and use cases, tailored to different user groups, while both stability providers and receivers maintain full control over their underlying bitcoin. No third party—not even an oracle—can confiscate a user’s funds. Although some existing stablecoins offer a degree of self-custody, they by contrast remain vulnerable to censorship, with operators able to blacklist addresses and effectively render associated funds worthless.

Unfortunately, this approach also inherits several challenges and limitations inherent to self-custodial systems. Building on Lightning and payment channels introduces online requirements, which have been cited as barriers to the widespread adoption of these technologies. Because stable channels monitor price fluctuations through regular and frequent settlements, any party going offline can disrupt the maintenance of the peg, leading to potential instability. In an article further detailing his thoughts on the idea, Dorier entertains various potential solutions to a party going offline, mainly insisting that re-establishing the peg of funds already allocated to a channel “is a cheap operation.”

Another potentially viable solution to the complex management of the peg involves the creation of ecash mints, which would issue stable notes to users and handle the channel relation with the stability provider. This approach already has real-world implementations and could see more rapid adoption due to its superior user experience. The obvious tradeoff is that custodial risks are reintroduced into a system designed to eliminate them. Still, proponents of ecash argue that its strong privacy and censorship-resistant properties make it a vastly superior alternative to popular stablecoins, which are prone to surveillance and control.

Beyond this, the complexity of the Lightning protocol and the inherent security challenges posed by keeping funds at risk in “hot” channels will need careful consideration when scaling operations.

Perhaps the most pressing challenge for this technology is the dynamic nature of the peg, which may attract noncooperative actors seeking to exploit short-term, erratic price movements. Referred to as the “free-option problem,” a malicious participant could cease honoring the peg, leaving their counterparties exposed to volatility and the burden of reestablishing a peg with another provider. In a post on the developer-focused Delving Bitcoin forum, stable channel developer Tony Klaus outlines several strategies to mitigate this issue, offering potential safeguards against these types of opportunistic behaviors.

While no silver bullet exists, the emergence of a market for stability providers could potentially foster reputable counterparties whose long-term business interests will outweigh the short-term gains of defrauding users. As competition increases, these providers will have strong incentives to maintain trust and reliability, creating a more robust and dependable ecosystem for users seeking stability in their transactions.

Concluding his presentation in Riga, Dorier acknowledged the novelty of this experiment but encouraged attendees to also consider its enticing potential.

“It’s very far-fetched, it’s a new idea. It’s a new type of money. You need new business models. You need new protocols and new infrastructure. It’s something more long-term, more forward-looking.”

Users and developers interested to learn or contribute to the technology can find more information on the website or through the public Telegram channel.



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